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No Caste Here? Toward a Structural
Critique of American Education
Daniel Kiel*
ABSTRACT
In his famous dissent in Plessy v. Ferguson, Justice John Marshall
Harlan argued that in the United States, there was "no caste here."
Justice Harlan was rejecting the idea that American society operated to
assign preordained outcomes to individuals based upon classifications,
including racial classifications. This Article questions whether Justice
Harlan's aspirational assertion accurately reflects contemporary
American education. Identifying: (1) multiple classification
mechanisms, all of which have disproportionate racial effects, and (2)
structural legal, political, and practical impediments to reform, the
Article argues that the American education system does more to maintain
the nation's historical racial hierarchy than to disrupt it. This is so, the
Article suggests, despite popular agreement with the casteless ideal and
popular belief that education can provide the opportunity to transcend
social class. By building the framework for a broad structural critique,
the Article suggests that a failure to acknowledge and address structural
flaws will preclude successful comprehensive reform with more
equitable outcomes.
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INTRODUCTION
The frustration and disgust in the famous dissent of John Marshall
Harlan from the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Plessy v. Ferguson' is
palpable. Writing alone in dissent from a decision that found the practice
of racial segregation in Louisiana railcars to be constitutional, Justice
Harlan recognized the undeniable intent of segregation laws: the
subjugation of African Americans.2 In contrast to this intent, he set out
an appealing interpretation of the Constitution: "[I]n view of the
constitution, in the eye of the law, there is in this country no superior,
dominant, ruling class of citizens. There is no caste here."3
Justice Harlan's "no caste here" assertion expressed an aspiration
rather than a reality; indeed, his eight colleagues had just ensured that a
comprehensive racial caste system would be maintained in the post-
slavery era. Over time, Justice Harlan's dissent took on the air of
prophecy,4 anticipating Plessy's ultimate fate-an infamous, even
shameful, decision that would be discredited by history.5 However, more
than a century later, the aspiration of a country without racial
stratification has hardly been realized. Explicitly racial Jim Crow laws
have been eliminated. Open racism is no longer a political badge of
honor. But even as the nation commemorates important anniversaries in
1. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
2. Id. at 557 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
3. Id. at 559.
4. See, e.g., Devon W. Carbado & Cheryl I. Harris, The New Racial Preferences,
96 CALIF. L. REv. 1139, 1206 n.228 (2008) (gathering references to Justice Harlan's
dissent, including some calling it "prophetic").
5. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("In my opinion, the
judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be quite as pernicious as the decision
made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott Case.").
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the dismantling of the Jim Crow caste system, there is great frustration
that racial disparities persist.6 Recently, such frustrations exploded in
places like Ferguson, Missouri, over perceived biases by law-
enforcement officers and the failure of the legal system to hold officers
accountable for biased actions, such as killing unarmed African
American suspects! Some scholars have critiqued structures that allow
disparities to persist in other contexts.8
The goal of this Article is to build on that work and apply it in the
context of American education. This Article's proposed contribution is
not in uncovering new developments in education law or policy; much of
what is presented is well known and has been ably argued elsewhere.
Rather, this is the beginning of a larger project aiming to connect the dots
among existing works to construct a comprehensive critique of the
system and thereby reframe the problem of racial disparities in education
as a problem with the structure of the system itself. At its core, this
Article suggests that, despite Justice Harlan's aspirations, there is caste
here, and the structure of American education helps make it so.
A caste system uses a network of laws, policies, customs, and
institutions collectively operating to ensure that certain groups remain in
a predetermined status within society.9 A fundamental component of any
caste system is a classification mechanism through which individuals in
different categories can be separated and treated differently."° This
6. This frustration is often articulated with claims to the effect that schools remain
"separate and unequal." See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American
Public Education Today, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1461, 1461-62 (2003); Robert A. Garda, Jr.,
Coming Full Circle: The Journey from Separate but Equal to Separate and Unequal
Schools, 2 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL'Y 1, 4 (2007).
7. See, e.g., Kevin King, Effectively Implementing Civilian Oversight Boards To
Ensure Police Accountability and Strengthening Police-Community Relations, 12
HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 91, 94 (2015) (including summaries of reactions in
Ferguson, Missouri, to the killing of Michael Brown by local police as part of an
argument in support of Civilian Oversight Boards).
8. See, e.g., MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN
THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS 12-13 (2010) (arguing that the criminal justice system
operates to reconstitute racial caste). See generally WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, MORE
THAN JUST RACE: BEING BLACK AND POOR IN THE INNER CITY (2010) (identifying
structural factors impacting racial disparities in housing, employment, and family);
DONNA L. FRANKLIN, ENSURING INEQUALITY: THE STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION OF THE
AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILY (1997) (connecting institutional factors to marriage and
family decisions in African American families).
9. Id.
10. See CHARLES TILLY, DURABLE INEQUALITY 62-63 (1998) ("A category consists
of a set of actors who share a boundary distinguishing all of them from and relating all of
them to at least one set of actors visibly excluded by that boundary. A category
simultaneously lumps together actors deemed similar, splits sets of actors considered
dissimilar, and defines relations between the two sets.").
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Article focuses on the classification mechanisms utilized to separate
students and the legal, political, and practical effects of that sorting.
Specifically, the Article begins by describing the role education
plays in either maintaining a caste system or disrupting it. Although
there are examples of education both creating and undoing caste in
America, Part I describes the historical roots of American education as a
critical part of successive racial caste systems.
Part II discusses contemporary sorting mechanisms that separate
students from their peers. These mechanisms include student-assignment
policies that sort by geography, by merit, and by disciplinary practices.
Each of these sorting mechanisms has a substantial correlation to race-
geographic sorting often has the effect of creating racially homogenous
schools, while merit tracking and disciplinary practices have been shown
to be administered in racially disparate ways. Thus, although
contemporary sorting is neither explicitly racial nor racially absolute, as
it was during Jim Crow, the classification mechanisms used today
continue to create racially identifiable groups of students.
Part III discusses some of the caste-creating or caste-maintaining
effects of contemporary sorting systems. As an initial matter, the sorting
allows for differentiated resources to be allocated to different groups
within the system. Such disparately allocated resources include not only
tangible resources like money but also intangible resources like teacher
or peer quality. Further, contemporary methods of classification insulate
even a largely segregated and racially unequal education system from
legal challenges due to the colorblindness of, and educational
justifications for, today's classifications. Finally, the sorting system
creates practical and political impediments to remedial efforts, thus
reducing the enthusiasm for, or the effectiveness of, interventions to
close educational gaps.
This Article does not seek to minimize the importance of searching
for effective policy changes or legal strategies within the existing
structure. Rather, it seeks to complement that effort by bringing into
focus flaws inherent in the existing structure and exposing how these
flaws ensure the caste-maintaining outcomes so many advocates fight
against. By emphasizing this structural critique, the Article argues that
advocates today, like those of the past, face a comprehensive, though
facially non-discriminatory system of inequality and that failing to
conceive of the problem in this way will ensure that disparities persist.
I. EDUCATION AND CASTE
Education of children is a crucial tool for shaping a society. Critical
decisions about what to teach, to whom it should be taught, and by whom
[Vol. 119:3
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it should be financed both reflect and perpetuate social norms. When
societies are highly stratified, education can justify and maintain that
stratification, ensuring that caste divisions remain effective. Conversely,
critics of caste-based societies may also look to education as a means of
empowering individuals or altering institutions in order to break down
existing barriers. The same tool, therefore, holds the potential to deliver
two vastly different outcomes-preservation of a caste system, or
destruction of it.
The importance of education in American caste is demonstrated by
the fact that Plessy, a case about caste but not education, justified its
caste-maintaining holding by an earlier case allowing for segregation in
schools in Massachusetts.II The centrality of education to caste is
reinforced by the fact that an education case, Brown v. Board of
Education,2 ultimately reversed Plessy.
13
In historical caste systems in the United States, education was
critical to the subjugation of African Americans during both the slavery
and Jim Crow eras of caste. During slavery, teaching slaves to read was
illegal.14 A colonial act in South Carolina noted that teaching slaves to
write "may be attended with great inconveniences" and fined any person
who did so 100 pounds.'5 Similarly, the slavery-era Virginia code
characterized any meeting of slaves to teach reading and writing as an
unlawful assembly, punishable by up to twenty lashes.16  Racial
segregation during the Jim Crow era enabled massive disparities in state-
provided resources for public education based on race, part of a
concerted effort at subjugation. In Alabama, for example, as
Reconstruction waned, spending on teacher salaries in white and black
schools, which had once been roughly equal, diverged to the point that
teacher spending was $30 per white student and less than $1 per African
American student.1 7 For his part, Justice Harlan did not interfere with
this arrangement when, just three years after Plessy, he wrote the
unanimous majority opinion in a case endorsing a scheme in which black
11. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896) (citing Roberts v. City of Boston,
59 Mass. 198 (1849)).
12. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
13. Id. at494-95.
14. DAVID TYACK, THOMAS JAMES & AARON BENAVOT, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF
PUBLIC EDUCATION, 1785-1954, at 134 (1987).
15. An Act for the Better Ordering and Governing Negroes and Other Slaves in this
Province, No. 670 (1740), art. XLV, reprinted in 7 THE STATUTES AT LARGE OF SOUTH
CAROLINA 397, 413 (David J. McCord ed., 1840).
16. 1VA. REV. CODE ch. 111,§ 15 (1819).
17. DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME 105-06 (1st Anchor
Books ed. 2009).
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schooling ceased before high school, while white schooling continued
through high school.
1 8
Bearing witness to these disparities, in part, drew Thurgood
Marshall to the cause of confronting segregation.19 The NAACP's
campaign to end Jim Crow segregation hinged greatly on the belief that
an education system that denied Americans the opportunity to move
beyond their predetermined caste was inconsistent with the Constitution.
The "equality" victories that preceded Brown embraced that ideal with
regard to both tangible and intangible resources.20 Then, Brown held that
the act of classification itself denied equality of educational opportunities
as guaranteed by the Constitution-"[s]eparate educational facilities are
inherently unequal.'
The Brown court eloquently described the centrality of education to
American life:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and
local governments.... It is required in the performance of our most
basic public responsibilities .... It is the very foundation of good
citizenship.... In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the
opportunity of an education.
22
Just as education had been utilized to subjugate in the past, the Brown
Court, calling the opportunity of an education "a right which must be
made available to all on equal terms," gave voice to the hope that
education could be the vehicle to dismantle the existing caste system.23
Brown vindicated Justice Harlan and held promise for moving the nation
closer to the society without caste he had envisioned.
However, six decades since Brown, racial disparities persist in
education. Even as education is hailed as the ticket to the American
dream,24 it has not succeeded in dismantling a social order that, more
18. See Cumming v. Richmond Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 541-45 (1899).
19. See JUAN WILLIAMS, THURGOOD MARSHALL: AMERICAN REVOLUTIONARY 63-64
(Three Rivers Press 1998).
20. See generally, e.g., McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ., 339 U.S.
637 (1950) (holding graduate school policies requiring segregation of African American
students within cafeteria and classrooms unconstitutional); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S.
629 (1950) (holding a separate law school for African American students to be
unconstitutional due to inequality in intangible factors, such as reputation and alumni
network, as compared to law school for white students).
21. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
22. Id. at 493.
23. Id.
24. Carol Morello et al., More People Express Uncertainty in Chance To Achieve





often than not, ends with African Americans in the most disadvantaged
position. Despite varied efforts to alter education law and policy and
disrupt this trend, a common lament is that schooling does not look all
that different today than it did during Jim Crow.25 Today, many students
are learning in racially homogenous schools, with the perceived worst-
performing schools being the ones serving largely African American
student populations. Whereas Charles Hamilton Houston and the
advocates he led faced a system explicitly designed to achieve this result,
today's system aspires to be consistent with Justice Harlan's vision of a
caste-free society. The structural critique presented here, however,
suggests that just as education was a tool of subjugation within the
American racial caste systems of the past, the contemporary system does
more to maintain caste than disrupt it.
The modem American education system did not emerge from a
vacuum. It is, rather, the product of a long process of tinkering.
According to one scholar, "institutionally sanctioned discrimination in
access to education is older than the American nation itself.,26  A
motivation to increase access for and reduce disparities among groups
within the system has driven many education reforms, particularly over
the past 60 years.27 However, despite claims (and examples) to the
contrary, education has more often served to create or perpetuate racial
stratification within society rather than as a system to ameliorate it. This
is because modem American education already has a head start in
achieving the effect of a caste system since it has the bones of a system
initiated in order to create and maintain racial caste. Further, today's
students have inherited both positive and negative legacies of previous
caste systems, preserving many disparities of the past.
A system of caste requires classifications of individuals. Within
education, this means classification of students. During Jim Crow, the
primary method of student classification was explicitly racial, and it was
absolute. It was explicitly racial in the sense that students were classified
based exclusively on their assigned race, and classification was mandated
by law. Racial classifications touched nearly every decision involved in
b7c8d2a594b9_story.html (discussing a Washington Post-Miller Center poll in which
education and hard work were ranked highest on the question of what is required to
achieve the American dream). Full survey results are available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/page/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2013/09/28/National-
Politics/Polling/release_266.xml?uuid-uD8cGiiSEeOKs7WqzJ4RZQ.
25. See generally, e.g., DERRICK BELL, SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN v. BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004); Chemerinsky,
supra note 6; Garda, supra note 6.
26. LINDA DARLING-HAMMOND, THE FLAT WORLD AND EDUCATION 28 (James A.
Banks ed., 2010).
27. See DAVID TYACK & LARRY CUBAN, TINKERING TowARD UTOPIA 47 (1995).
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operating schools, from student assignment to resource allocation. The
Jim Crow system was absolute in the sense that once a student was
racially classified, that student was required to attend certain schools and
prohibited from attending others. There were no exceptions from the
racial hierarchy. From this segregation, the system could deliver the
intended inequitable results.
Although explicit and absolute racial classifications are no longer
permissible, the various education reforms of the past 60 years have
largely left intact basic structures of the prior system. As an initial
matter, the assignment of responsibility to states and ultimately local
districts once allowed for segregation to be decided at the local level and
later provided the basis for resistance to aggressive desegregation
remedies. Such local administrative control remains the norm, with
districts enjoying sovereignty within and local funding from relatively
small, impenetrable boundaries. Dividing students geographically by
district or by school attendance zones remains a primary feature of
contemporary education, and separate administration remains the norm.
Contemporary American education not only maintains the
foundational structural elements of prior caste systems but also inherits
generational impacts on students from intentional discrimination of the
past. The costs of growing up within families that were systematically
denied the opportunity to learn may be difficult to measure, but lingering
effects of prior discrimination suggest that intentional disparities of the
past would continue to permeate even a perfectly egalitarian system.
28
This Article argues that in practice, contemporary American education is
far from perfectly egalitarian. It should not be surprising, then, that the
effects of a discriminatory past continue to infect contemporary
schooling. These unremedied generational disparities are a
28. Considered another way, one could say that the benefits of growing up within
systematically privileged families undoubtedly exist as well. To take one illustrative
example in the disadvantage faced by children of a formerly-subjugated group after the
end of a system of subjugation, consider the fate of the 55,000 black children attending
public school in Alabama in 1871, just after the Civil War. These children's parents were
largely illiterate and kept that way by law-any interference with that pattern was going
to have to come from school, as parents were not equipped to catch their children up.
BLACKMON, supra note 17, at 39. Recent work has confirmed the continuing correlation
between parental education level and student success. See, e.g., Sean F. Reardon, The
Widening Achievement Gap Between the Rich and the Poor: New Evidence and Possible
Explanations, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY? RISING INEQUALITY, SCHOOLS, AND
CHILDREN'S LIFE CHANCES 91, 106 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane eds., 2011);
Pamela E. Davis-Ken, The Influence of Parent Education and Family Income on Child
Achievement: The Indirect Role of Parental Expectations and the Home Environment, 19
J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 294, 294 (2005); Eric Dubow, Paul Boxer & L. Rowell Huesmann,
Long-term Effects of Parents' Education on Children's Educational and Occupational
Success: Mediation by Family Interactions, Child Aggression, and Teenage Aspirations,
55 MERRILL-PALMER Q. 224, 225 (2009).
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contemporary manifestation of prior caste systems, and the continued
failure to address them suggests that the education system is, at best, not
disrupting caste and, at worst, is maintaining it. In the next Part, this
Article turns to the contemporary American education system, beginning
with the modem classification system, which is neither explicitly racial
nor racially absolute, but which continues to create racially identifiable
classes of students within states, districts, and classrooms.
II. THE MODERN CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM
If a system operates on the basis of caste, that system must classify
those within it in order to deliver disparate treatment that can assign
individuals to the appropriate caste position. This Part discusses three
contemporary sorting mechanisms that separate students and enable
disparate experiences. First, geography is the primary criteria used to
determine the schools students will attend. Second, measures of skill,
merit, or interest are used to assign students to different programs,
schools, or peer groups. Finally, disciplinary policies often physically
separate students from the school, in some cases permanently. In
addition to these mechanisms within the public school system, there is
also a sorting out of students from public education into private or home
school environments that serves to further separate students. While these
sorting mechanisms are not racial, they continue to create groups of
students that are racially identifiable, an effect similar to the explicitly
racial classifications of the past.
A. Geographic Sorting
The primary sorting mechanism in an educational caste system is a
sorting of which students attend which schools. Within the public
system, the primary sorting for student assignment is geographic-first
by state, then by school district,29 then by school.30  Some movement
across school zone lines is permitted, such as through freedom of choice
programs or transfer opportunities. In fewer circumstances, movement is
allowed across district lines through interdistrict transfer programs or
policies that allow for enrollment of students from adjacent districts.
31
29. Hawaii does not break administration up into districts, but rather operates a
single statewide district. This, however, is a consistent source of proposed reform. Linda
Jacobson, Report Faults Hawaii's Statewide School District, EDUC. WEEK (Dec. 10,
2003), http://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2003/12/10/15hawaii.h23.html.
30. Most student assignments are made based on geographically-defined attendance
zones within a district, though many district have opportunities for families to choose
other school options.
31. Daniel Kiel, The Enduring Power of Milliken's Fences, 45 URB. LAW. 137, 148
nn.46-47 (2013).
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But, for most students, where they live determines where they will attend
school.
As has been the case throughout American educational history,
public education is the responsibility of state government, but its
administration and some of its funding is more locally based. Each local
school district is part of a larger state system but enjoys substantial
autonomy within its geographic boundaries, creating a sense of school-
district sovereignty. Districts are responsible to their own constituents
and have no responsibility to students beyond their borders.32
Geographic borders between districts were given even greater
importance in Milliken v. Bradley33 when the Supreme Court prohibited
courts from ignoring school district lines in crafting desegregation
remedies.34 Milliken thus strengthened the idea of district sovereignty.
School attendance zones operate similarly. A school is responsible
to the students within a given zone but has no responsibility to those
beyond the zone's boundaries. However, in contrast to school districts,
attendance zones are regularly altered (though not without controversy),
and the degree of school-level autonomy is generally less than that
enjoyed at the district level.
Impenetrable fences between school districts, like the racial laws
that preceded them, provide a mechanism for stratification. Just as the
separation of black schools and white schools once allowed for education
to be used as part of the Jim Crow system of caste, now schools in
district A and schools in district B, still explicitly separated, have the
potential to generate a similar effect. However, geographic separation of
districts is facially non-racial. Thus, to the extent geographic sorting
could be considered part of a racial caste system, geographic
classifications would have to result in racially homogenous districts or
schools. They do.35
32. Id. at 140 (citing Aaron Saiger, The School District Boundary Problem, 42 URB.
LAW. 495, 502 (2010)).
33. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974).
34. Id. at 752-53.
35. GARY ORFIELD, JOHN KUCSERA & GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY, THE CIVIL
RIGHTS PROJECT, E PLURIBUS . .. SEPARATION: DEEPENING DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR
MORE STUDENTS 9 (2012), available at http://civilrightsproject.ucla.edu/research/k-12-
education/integration-and-diversity/mlk-national/e-pluribus...separation-deepening-
double-segregation-for-more-students/orfield-epluribus revised-omplete_2012.pdf
(finding that "80% of Latino students and 74% of black students attend majority
nonwhite schools (50-100% minority), and 43% of Latinos and 38% of blacks attend
intensely segregated schools (those with only 0-10% of whites students) across the
nation"). These districts also serve a disproportionate number of Latino students.
However, this Article focuses on African Americans as its intent is to place the current
educational structure into the narrative of education-created subjugation, including
slavery and Jim Crow, that specifically targeted African Americans.
[Vol. 119:3
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For example, 15 percent of African American students attend
schools that are zero to one percent white.36 In metropolitan areas, those
numbers are even greater-in Chicago, for example, nearly half of black
students attend such schools.37  Enrollment in schools of racial
isolation-schools with minority student populations 90 percent or
greater-is even greater: 38 percent of African American students attend
such schools nationally, with figures in metropolitan areas like Chicago
and New York closer to 70 percent.38 In addition to segregation at the
school level, segregation between districts is an increasing feature of
contemporary American education.39
Although many schools and districts remain racially identifiable,
there are important distinctions between geographic and racial
classifications. The educational justification for local control is that
smaller units can be more responsive to and reflective of local needs and
thus can make choices about funding and curriculum priorities that will
best serve local students. The Supreme Court has stated: "[L]ocal
autonomy has long been thought essential both to the maintenance of
community concern and support for public schools and to quality of the
educational process.,40 By helping maintain local support for schools,
local control increases educational quality.
In addition, although there may be disparities between districts A
and B and although there may be disparate racial makeups of the two
districts, the racial element is neither explicit nor absolute. There are
white children in both districts and black children in both districts.41 In
this sense, it is not a color-conscious racialized caste system-instead, it
is officially a colorblind, geographically-based system. The
colorblindness of this sorting mechanism has important effects.42
However, it is worth noting that although the colorblind nature of the
sorting ensures that not every black student is being sorted into a position
of disadvantage43-- certainly a good thing--colorblindness legally and
politically insulates from substantive critique a system that operates with
persistent racial disparities.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 58 tbl.24.
38. Id. at 9, 58 tbl.24.
39. Jennifer Jellison Holme & Kara S. Finnigan, School Diversity, School District
Fragmentation and Metropolitan Policy, 115 TCHRS. C. REc. 1, 2-3 (2013).
40. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741-42 (1974).
41. This may be less true at the school level where single-race schools still persist.
See ORFIELD, KUCSERA & SIEGEL-HAWLEY, supra note 35, at 9 (finding that 15% of
black students and 14% of Latino students attend schools where whites make up 0-1% of
the enrollment).
42. See infra Part Il1.
43. And not every white student is put in a position of advantage.
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B. Sorting by Choice, Briefly
This Article primarily focuses on the public system of education.
However, an initial sorting of American students has the effect of
excluding approximately 10-15 percent of the school-age population
from the public system altogether.44 Students who attend private schools
or learn in a homeschool environment are outside of the system
discussed here and are largely untouched by public education reform.
The entitlement of parents and students to opt out of the public system is
constitutionally protected.45  The sorting out of privately-schooled
students excludes a disproportionately white and wealthy group of
students from the public system. For example, the public school
population is 52.4 percent white, while white students make up 72.6
percent of private school students and 68 percent of home-schooled
students.46 This public-private separation represents another structural
feature that contributes to the racial identifiability of schooling
experience for many American students.
C. Meritocratic Sorting
The system not only sorts by geography to determine who goes to
which school and in which district,47 but it also sorts students in various
44. Approximately 4-5 million students attended private schools in 2010-2011. See
JESSICA DAVIS & KURT BAUMAN, SCHOOL ENROLLMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: 2011, at 6
(2013); Stephanie Ewert, The Decline in Private School Enrollment 8 (U.S. Census
Bureau SEHSD Working Paper No. FY12-117, 2013). In addition, approximately 3% of
the school-aged population was homeschooled in 2011-2012. Fast Facts:
Homeschooling, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=91 (last visited Jan. 11, 2015). For
comparison, 49.5 million students attended public schools in 2010. Digest of Education
Statistics: Table 44, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/dl2/tables/dt12_044.asp (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
45. See Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535-36 (1925) (holding
compulsory public education statute unconstitutional); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 234-35 (1972) (holding that other constitutional rights can excuse a family's failure
to abide by compulsory attendance statute).
46. Approximate racial demographics for public, private, and home-school students
are as follows: students at public schools are 52.4% white, 16.0% black, 23.1% Hispanic,
and 5.0% Asian. Digest of Education Statistics: Table 44, supra note 45. Private school
students are 72.6% white, 9.2% black, 9.4% Hispanic, and 5.1% Asian. Private School
Universe Survey (PSS): Table 9, NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STAT.,
http://nces.ed.gov/surveys/pss/tables/table_2009_09.asp (last visited Jan. 11, 2015).
Home schooled students are 68% white, 8% black, 15% Hispanic, and 4% Asian. Fast
Facts: Homeschooling, supra note 44.
47. There is also developing evidence that the sorting of school choice serves to
segregate students racially. Thus, even when the initial assignment may not rigidly
enforce segregation, choice might. For example, charter schools have been found to have
more extensive segregation than traditional public schools. See generally ERICA
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other ways. This Article will use the umbrella term of meritocratic
sorting to describe any sorting that. uses measures of or assumptions
about students' skills, capacities, or interests to separate them from one
another. As with geographic sorting, the separation is what enables
disparate treatment.
Meritocratic sorting can take a variety of different forms. For
example, sorting of students by ability measured by achievement or
intelligence tests, often called tracking, is a form of meritocratic sorting.
Another form is classification by disability, including both the separation
of students with disabilities or students with specific content deficits,
such as limited English proficiency. Meritocratic sorting also includes
separation by interests, such as the distinction between vocational and
academically-advanced programs. This sorting can take place among
schools-such as with magnet schools or specialized interest programs-
or within schools that offer differing opportunities to different students.
It could even take place within classrooms to the extent that students are
exposed to different curricula based upon merit.
To take one example, it has been found that more than 90 percent of
first grade classrooms use some form of ability grouping, such as
differentiated reading groups.48 Just as occurs at the school level where
curricular and instructional practices are strongly determined by the
skills of students and by the expectations of teachers, resulting in lower-
performing students being exposed to a less demanding curriculum, this
sort of differentiation occurs within classrooms as well. Lower reading
groups can be taught a less demanding curriculum affecting not only how
much the student learns but also how the student thinks of him or
herself.49 While this result may trouble some, it may be justified by the
relative increase in opportunities that "high" track students receive-but
for ability grouping, these students may not be pushed to reach their own
full potential.
With geographic sorting, the benefits of local control justify the
separation of students. The idea that an individual's education should be
tailored to the needs and interests of each student justifies the individual
sorting described here. This reasoning is pedagogically alluring-only
by responding to individual circumstances can an education enable each
student to reach her potential-and it is consistent with the idea that
resources should be distributed according to merit.
FRANKENBURG, GENEVIEVE SIEGEL-HAWLEY & JIA WANG, CHOICE WITHOUT EQUITY
(2010).
48. George Farkas, Racial Disparities and Discrimination in Education: What Do
We Know, How Do We Know It, and What Do We Need To Know?, 105 TCHRS. C. REC.
1119, 1126 (2003).
49. DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 26, at 51; Farkas, supra note 48, at 1131.
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A meritocracy is a system where rewards are distributed according
to merit, measured through effort, achievement, or need. A meritocracy
is the precise opposite of a caste system, where some innate
characteristic restricts an individual to some predetermined fate. The
crucial component of a meritocracy is the ability to objectively define
and measure merit. If the measurement of merit is infected by subjective
bias, then the whole idea crumbles.
In practice, many measures of individual merit utilized for sorting
American students demonstrate bias. And in most cases, the process
disfavors minority students. Controlling for other variables, ability
grouping tends to disproportionately place African American students in
lower tracks.50 If the sorting of students into different tracks is biased
and if the effects of that sorting tend to widen gaps, then individual
classifications through programs like ability grouping will structurally
maintain, even widen, disparities in educational opportunities.
The problem begins early and compounds on itself throughout the
schooling experience. The disproportionate sorting of African American
students into low track reading groups in first grade is repeated
throughout the educational cycle through graduation. Similar disparities
are found in identification of students for gifted services,51 and
eventually in enrollment in Advanced Placement courses.52
As with geographic sorting, meritocratic sorting is facially
colorblind, yet has the effect of recreating racially identifiable groups
that receive different educations. Here, the differentiated experience is
deliberate-the whole idea of tracking, ability grouping, or specialized
programs is to provide a tailored experience different from a standard
education. The racial disparities in grouping, though unintentional, are
real. The persistence of racially identifiable grouping, whether by
geography or merit, demonstrates that even a non-racial classification
system can operate to perpetuate racial caste.
50. Roslyn Mickelson, Subverting Swann: First- and Second-Generation
Segregation in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 38 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 215, 217
(2001); DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 26, at 57-60.
51. Kathleen Barlow & C. Elaine Dunbar, Race, Class, and Whiteness in Gifted and
Talented Identification, 1 BERKELEY REV. EDOC. 63, 64 (2010); see also Al Baker, In One
School, Students Are Divided by Gifted Label - and Race, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2013, at
MB 1.
52. COLL. BD., THE 10TH ANNUAL AP REPORT TO THE NATION 30 fig.8 (2014),
available at http://media.collegeboard.com/digitalServices/pdf/ap/rtn/1Oth-annua/10th-
annual-ap-report-to-the-nation-two-page-spread.pdf ( inding that African American
students were the most underrepresented in advanced placement ("AP") classrooms,
where only 9.2% of AP students were black, despite the 2013 graduating class having




Although racial sorting may exist in schools, an additional form of
sorting takes students entirely out of classrooms. Studies of student
disciplinary practices have consistently shown that African American
students are more likely to be suspended and expelled. Even in
preschool, African American students, who make up only 18 percent of
preschool enrollment, make up 42 percent of the students suspended.3
Overall suspension rates demonstrate similar disparities-24 percent of
African American students have been suspended, compared to only 7
percent of white students.54 Such suspensions further steer those
suspended students (disproportionately African American) toward
academic disengagement, lower achievement, and increased risk of
dropout, creating what many have described as the school-to-prison
pipeline.55
Thus, the system first sorts based on geography into districts and
schools with a high racial correlation, and then based on ability or
performance into separate schools, classrooms or groups, again with a
racial correlation. And finally, students are sorted out of the classroom
by disciplinary practices that also have a racial correlation. Thus, at
every step of the process, beginning with the decision of who goes to
which school all the way to decisions about who gets excluded from
school, the system operates in a way that solidifies rather than disrupts
the caste system that has long existed in the nation's education system.
III. EFFECTS OF THE SORTING
The classification system described above accomplishes a critical
first step in enabling the perpetuation of racial caste-it creates groups of
students that are largely racially identifiable. Where districts, schools,
classrooms, and reading groups remain separated with racial correlations,
the opportunity for differentiated treatment-and largely racially
53. Expansive Survey of America's Public Schools Reveals Troubling Racial
Disparities, U.S. DEP'T EDUC. (Mar. 21, 2014), http://www.ed.gov/news/press-
releases/expansive-survey-americas-public-schools-reveals-troubling-racial-disparities.
54. Donna St. George, Researchers Point to Racial Disparities in School
Suspension, Spotlight New Practices, WASH. POST (Mar. 14, 2014),
http://www.washingtonpost.coi/local/education/researchers-point-to-racial disparities-
in-school-suspension-spotlight-new-practices/2014/03/14/0017cd98-aaa7- 11 e3 adbc-
888c8010c799 story.html (citing the work of the Discipline Disparities Collaborative).
55. See, e.g., CATHERINE Y. KIM ET AL., THE SCHOOL-TO-PRISON PIPELINE:
STRUCTURING LEGAL REFORM 1-4 (2010) ("The School-to-Prison Pipeline thus refers to
the confluence of education policies in underresourced public schools and a
predominantly punitive juvenile justice system that fails to provide education and mental
health services for our most at-risk students and drastically increases the likelihood that
these children will end up with a criminal record rather than a high school diploma.").
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differentiated treatment-is present. However, a comprehensive
structural critique must include not only an examination of how the
structure creates or maintains disparities but also an explanation of why
these outcomes are difficult to confront.
One possible explanation is that people are not aware of the
disparities of the system. This is not the case. Ironically, the same
system that enables disparate treatment also makes comparisons across
schools, districts, or states easier. In other words, it is only because of
the rigid, differentiated structure that the disparities within the system are
so glaring. This was the case during the Jim Crow era of education as
well, and the ease with which evidence could be developed which
demonstrated disparities among black and white schools made cases
challenging segregation more successful. The contemporary educational
structure has not been insulated from challenge due to lack of evidence
or knowledge of racial disparities.
Highlighted by Brown and continuing in the decades since,
incessant waves of reform aimed at reducing racial stratification within
education have challenged the caste-maintaining status quo. There are
two primary critiques of the caste system underpinning the reform
movement: first, there are challenges to the sorting process itself;
second, there are challenges to the differentiated treatment enabled by
the sorting. Brown is an example of the first critique, while legal
challenges to funding disparities across districts is an example of the
second. Challenges may occur through litigation or legislation, or
through local policy choices aimed at reducing disparities, uch as where
to locate specialized programs or how to identify students for those
programs.
That such challenges occur is a welcomed sign of a nation
dissatisfied with racial disparities. That such challenges have occurred in
courtrooms, legislatures, and classrooms for decades but have not
substantially disrupted the racial disparities within the education system
is disheartening. This Part argues that a reason for the limited success
over the past 60 years is that contemporary classification structures that
have replaced the explicit and absolute racial sorting of the past insulate
the system from substantial intervention. These classification structures
provide insulation legally, politically, and practically.
Specifically, a series of legal holdings have embraced the
geographic and meritocratic sorting, making establishing unlawfulness of
even a vastly unequal system exceedingly high, particularly in the
absence of intent. Further, the structure makes political support for
systemic change difficult to generate or sustain. And finally,
interventions are constrained in practice by the larger structure in which
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they are implemented, ensuring that even successful interventions will
remain isolated exceptions within the overall enterprise.
A. Insulation from Legal Challenge
Some of the most successful efforts to disrupt racial caste in
American education have come through litigation. Under Jim Crow,
litigation was used to push for equalized resources, and Brown declared
racial sorting unconstitutional.56 Various state courts have found funding
schemes that deliver unequal resources to different districts
impermissible, and the use of non-racial classifications to sort racially
has been disallowed.57 However, contemporary sorting seems to be
insulated from legal challenge. A substantial degree of this insulation
comes from another idea found in Justice Harlan's Plessy dissent:
colorblindness.5 8 Because today's sorting is race neutral on its face-
that is, it is neither explicitly nor absolutely racial-both the
classification system and the differentiated treatment of classes within
the system are protected from arguments used in the past, such as equal
protection challenges. This protection of sorting comes from legal
developments in the decades ince Brown. Specifically, district lines are
considered sacrosanct, and inequalities across district lines are tolerated.
Further, meritocratic sorting that is colorblind is reviewed with great
deference and, even where it results in racially disparate impact, is
difficult to establish as unlawful.
1. Local Control and the Toleration of Inequality
As described above, geographic sorting is the primary basis for
classification of students, and this geographic sorting-by district and by
school-attendance zone-often leads to racially identifiable districts and
schools. Some have argued that district lines play a "decisive role in
determining the quality of education that a student will receive.
59
However, despite such criticism, the Supreme Court has made clear that
district lines cannot be ignored.
In Milliken v. Bradley, the Court asserted, "No single tradition in
public education is more deeply rooted than local control over the
56. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
57. See Aaron Y. Tang, Broken Systems, Broken Duties: A New Theory for School
Finance Litigation, 94 MARQ. L. REV 1195, 1202-11 (2011) (summarizing a number of
such court decisions); Michael Heise, State Constitutions, School Finance Litigation, and
the "Third Wave": From Equity to Adequacy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1151, 1157-66 (1995).
58. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 559 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. Erika Wilson, Leveling Localism and Racial Inequality in Education Through
the No Child Left Behind Public Choice Provision, 44 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 625, 630
(2011).
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operation of schools.,60 As a result, the district court's proposed remedy
for Detroit's school segregation, a remedy that included surrounding
school districts in a regional student-assignment plan, was beyond the
court's authority.6' The Milliken Court elevated the importance of
district lines, noting that "the notion that district lines may be casually
ignored or treated as a mere administrative convenience is contrary to the
history of public education in our country.,62 In the years following
Milliken, a trend toward consolidating school districts abruptly ceased as
sovereign districts were insulated from federal court remedies, even as
many suburban districts served white families relocating from cities
subject to desegregation decrees.63
Although Milliken helps establish that district lines-and with them,
geographic sorting-are sacrosanct, this holding is even more significant
when combined with the Court's view that inequality across district lines
does not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the U.S. Constitution.64
In Brown, the Supreme Court stated plainly that "education, where the
state provides it, is a right which must be made available to all on an
equal basis.,65  When pushed on this equality mandate, however, the
Court demonstrated tolerance for extraordinary inequality across district
lines.
In San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
66
plaintiffs from a school district in a poor area of San Antonio brought an
equal protection challenge to Texas's school financing scheme.67 The
plaintiffs' district, Edgewood Independent School District, served a high
percentage of Hispanic students and, through property taxes, was able to
generate approximately $26 per student in local funding.68 In Alamo
Heights, another district also within San Antonio that served an 80%
white student population, local property taxes (set at a lower rate)
generated $333 per student, nearly 13 times the local funding in
Edgewood.69
60. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 741 (1974).
61. Id. at 752-53.
62. Id. at 741.
63. See Christopher Berry & Martin West, Growing Pains: The School
Consolidation Movement and Student Outcomes, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 1,4 (2010).
64. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 54 (1973).
65. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
66. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
67. Id. at 4-7.
68. Id. at 12.
69. Id. at 12-13. In addition to local funding, both districts received approximately
$220 in state funding per pupil. Id. Edgewood received $108 per pupil in federal




In finding this setup constitutional, the Supreme Court disputed the
relevance of school spending to educational quality and held that so long
as the state was providing an adequate education to all students,
inequities did not offend the Constitution.70 According to the Court, the
Constitution thus tolerates vast inequities in educational inputs.
Unequal outputs are constitutionally tolerable as well. Even in the
context of remedying previous state-sponsored racial discrimination, the
Supreme Court has stated that achievement of parity across district lines
in student achievement is not a constitutionally mandated goal. In
Missouri v. Jenkins,71 a federal district court utilized interdistrict
comparability to determine if the vestiges of segregation had been
eliminated from schools in Kansas City, Missouri.72 In essence, the
district court felt that the only way to determine whether Kansas City
students were learning at the same level as suburban peers and were no
longer burdened by previous discrimination was to compare their
achievement directly to adjacent districts.73 The Supreme Court rejected
this theory: "The District Court's pursuit of 'desegregative
attractiveness' cannot be reconciled with our cases placing limitations on
a district court's remedial authority.,74 Those limitations had been laid
out in Milliken.
Thus, Milliken establishes that district lines are sacrosanct, while
Rodriguez and Jenkins make clear that inequities across those lines do
not offend the Constitution. Given this, geographic classification is
insulated from challenge under the U.S. Constitution. In several states,
district inequities have been found to violate state constitutions, but as
discussed below, remedying such unconstitutional schemes has proven
politically and practically difficult.
2. Colorblindness and the Difficulty of Proving Discrimination
Even if geographic sorting results in racially identifiable schools or
districts, it is still a colorblind classification system. The same is true of
meritocratic sorting-it is facially colorblind even if it produces racially
identifiable districts. Although colorblindness ensures that race is not, on
70. See id. at 54-55. Rodriguez's mandate for the provision of an adequate
education comes into sharper focus when compared to cases where states have excluded
classes of students from schools altogether. For example, in Plyler v. Doe, the Court
declared Texas's exclusion of undocumented students from public schools to be
unconstitutional. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 230 (1982). Similarly, a district court held
that exclusion of students with disabilities from schools would violate constitutional due
process. Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 876 (D.D.C. 1972).
71. Missouri v. Jenkins, 515 U.S. 70 (1995).
72. Id. at 70.
73. Id. at 91-92.
74. Id. at 98.
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its own, determinative of any individual student's fate, colorblindness
makes legal challenge of a system that continues to produce racially
disparate outcomes extraordinarily difficult. First, the shift from racial to
non-racial sorting makes constitutional challenge virtually impossible.
Since racial classifications automatically evoke strict constitutional
scrutiny75 and geographic classifications engender great deference to the
legislative decisions,76 the state need only provide some rational basis for
its system of geographic classification, regardless of resulting disparities,
in order to satisfy the Equal Protection Clause. Thus, the burden on the
state to justify the system is far lower. If the new sorting were not also
producing racially isolated schools, then such a lowering of the burden
would not be problematic. However, because the system locks in the
disparities of the old racial system and makes geographic classification
nearly as impenetrable as racial classification once was, the lowered
burden has the perverse effect of disarming today's educational equity
advocates. Some scholars have argued that advocates of the Plessy era
had stronger legal tools at their disposal than the advocates of today.77 In
addition, colorblindness masks the racial nature of the caste system,
which undercuts structural criticisms like the one posed in this Article.
These two effects are discussed in greater detail below.
In addition, federal courts are often reluctant to impose policies on
schools. Perhaps in response to the protracted federal court involvement
in post-Brown desegregation cases and the resulting political backlash
against federal courts, federal courts often exercise restraint in second-
guessing educational decisions and policies. Rodriguez indicates a
strong embrace of local control and deference to the judgment of Texas
legislators and educational experts in devising a rational educational
75. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013) (noting that strict
scrutiny imposes an "ultimate burden of demonstrating, before turning to racial
classifications, that available, workable race-neutral alternatives do not suffice"); Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) ("It is well
established that when the government distributes burdens or benefits on the basis of
individual racial classifications, that action is reviewed under strict scrutiny."); Gratz v.
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 270 (2003) (noting that "[r]acial classifications are simply too
pernicious to permit any but the most exact connection between justification and
classification") (alteration in original) (quoting Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 537
(1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)).
76. This is true presuming that the legislature is not shown to have made the
geographic classifications with the intent to discriminate on some other basis, such as
race. See Gerald Neuman, Territorial Discrimination, Equal Protection and Self-
Determination, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 261, 271-75 (1987).
77. See Gloria J. Ladson-Billings, Can We At Least Have Plessy? The Struggle for
Quality Education, 85 N.C. L. REv. 1279, 1280 (2007); Rick Guzman, An Argument for
a Return to Plessy v. Ferguson: Why Illinois Should Reconsider the Doctrine of
"Separate but Equal" Public Schools, 29 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 149, 151 (2008).
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system.78 In Jenkins, the Court expressed concern about the federal court
becoming a de facto and permanent superintendent of schools and the
negative impact that would have on local control.79 This reluctance to
interfere with educational policies that cause or perpetuate inequalities
further diminishes the likelihood that federal courts will be a venue to
disrupt the current system.
Courts are able to be deferential in such cases because, as long as
policies are race neutral and are pursued without any provable intent to
discriminate, they are scrutinized under the Court's rational basis review.
Only where students are treated differently based on race is a higher level
of scrutiny applied.80  However, 60 years after Brown, instances of
explicit race-based discriminatory practices are rare--colorblindness is
the rule of the day.81
Further, even if race neutral policies produce racially disparate
impacts, there can be no finding of unconstitutional discrimination absent
78. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 42-43 (1973). The
Court reasoned:
[T]his case also involves the most persistent- and difficult questions of
educational policy, another area in which this Court's lack of specialized
knowledge and experience counsels against premature interference with the
informed judgments made at the state and local levels. . . . [T]he very
complexity of the problems of financing and managing a statewide public
school system suggests that "there will be more than one constitutionally
permissible method of solving them," and that within the limits of rationality,
"the legislature's efforts to tackle the problems" should be entitled to respect...
[Tihe judiciary is well advised to refrain from imposing on the States
inflexible constitutional restraints that could circumscribe or handicap the
continued research and experimentation so vital to finding even partial
solutions to educational problems and to keeping abreast of ever-changing
conditions.
Id.
79. Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 98-99. The Court noted that this rationale-that
establishing equity across district lines could be a valid goal of desegregation-is "not
susceptible to any objective limitation." Id. at 98. The Court also noted:
[T]he greater [the district's] dependence on state funding, the greater its
reliance on continued supervision by the District Court. But our cases
recognize that local autonomy of school districts is a vital national tradition,
and that a district court must strive to restore state and local authorities to the
control of a school system operating in compliance with the Constitution.
Id. (citation omitted); see also Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489-90 (1992)
("Returning schools to the control of local authorities at the earliest practicable date is
essential to restore their true accountability in our governmental system. . . . Where
control lies, so too does responsibility.").
80. A higher level of scrutiny would also apply to the extent that a "fundamental
right" were interfered with even without any racial classification. However, education
has been found to not qualify as a fundamental right. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 37.
81. See, e.g., Fisher v. Univ. of Tex., 133 S. Ct. 2411, 2420 (2013); Parents
Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 701 (2007).
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a finding of intent, a requirement imposed by the Court in 1976.82
Evidence of disparate impact may be relevant to claims of intentional
discrimination,83 and statutory basis remains for disparate impact
claims.84 However, even those statutory claims may no longer be
pursued by private litigants, but rather must be enforced by federal
agencies.85  Even where courts do hear complaints regarding such
policies, such as challenges to the adoption of high stakes tests, tracking,
or student disciplinary policies with racially disparate effects, the policies
may still be found legal if they can be shown to be educationally
necessary.86 This provides another opportunity for courts to defer to
local and educational authorities-so long as a practice can be justified
in some way educationally and cannot be tied directly to a history of
racial discrimination, courts have tended to err on the side of allowing
the practice to continue.87
The erosion of disparate impact heory as a basis for a finding of
discrimination has substantially increased the burden on those claiming
systemic discrimination because evidence of intent is difficult to
uncover. This development has worked together with judicial restraint as
a matter of principle or deference to local decision making-including
82. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 232 (1976).
83. Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 253 (1977)
(laying out a series of factors, such as the degree of disparate impact and the historical
background leading up to the implementation of a disparity-producing policy that could
be utilized to help prove intent).
84. While Washington v. Davis restricted constitutional claims to those evidencing
intent and Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 428 U.S. 262, 262 (1978), held that the
scope of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was identical to the scope of the Equal
Protection Clause, regulations enacted under Title VI continue to allow disparate impact
claims to be brought. FTC Credit Practices Rule, 34 C.F.R. § 100.3(b)(2); see also
Jennifer Braceras, Killing the Messenger: The Misuse of Disparate Impact Theory To
Challenge High-Stakes Educational Tests, 55 VAND. L. REv. 1111, 1117-21 (2002).
85. Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 275 (2001).
86. See, e.g., G.I. Forum v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 87 F. Supp. 2d 667, 677 (W.D. Tex.
2000) (citing Wards Cove Packaging, Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 656-57 (1989) from
the context of Title VII employment, to lay out the disparate impact burden-shifting
analysis under Title VI in a high stakes testing case). Even if a policy is proved to be
educationally necessary, plaintiffs could still prevail if they are able to show that a
feasible alternative would be as effective without producing the same degree of disparate
impact. See Braceras, supra note 84, at 1159.
87. See Zachary W. Best, Derailing the Schoolhouse-to-Jailhouse Track: Title VI
and a New Approach to Disparate Impact Analysis in Public Education, 99 GEO L.J.
1671, 1674 (2011) ("[A]dvocates have found it exceedingly difficult to convince courts
to take action against disparate racial outcomes without proof of discriminatory intent.")
(citing Charles Abernathy, Legal Realism and the Failure of the Effects Test for
Discrimination, 94 GEO. L.J. 267, 270 (2006); Olatunde C.A. Johnson, Disparity Rules,
107 COLUM. L. REv. 374, 396 (2007); Michael Selmi, Was the Disparate Impact Theory a
Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REv. 701, 705-06 (2006)).
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parental decision making-as a matter of law to substantially diminish
the ability of courts to interfere with a caste-preserving system.
B. Insulation from Political Change
Litigation is not the only route to challenge contemporary
educational classifications or their disparate effects. There is political
support for the goal of closing the racial achievement gap that could
manifest itself in legislative or other policy proposals that could
effectively accomplish that goal. Such proposals require political
support. Unfortunately, several features of the contemporary
classification structure make generating and sustaining that political
support difficult.
Sorting narrows the frame of political engagement and fragments
political support for broad educational reform, often pitting advocates for
differently-sorted groups against one another. In addition, just as
colorblindness insulates both geographic and meritocratic sorting from
legal challenge, it politically insulates these classifications as well. By
obscuring the racial effects of sorting through the use of colorblind and
sometimes merit-based classifications, contemporary educational sorting
appeals to non-racial explanations for persistent racial disparities.
Further, the success of some minority students within the current system
undercuts arguments that the system inherently perpetuates racial caste.
Given these headwinds created by the way contemporary classification
occurs, the system is protected from broad political challenge.
1. Narrowing the Frame of Engagement
A significant effect of local control is to limit the frame of concern
for individuals within a local district's boundaries to the schools within
that district. To citizens, taxpayers, and perhaps parents or alumni,
schools beyond district borders are of minimal or no concern. Within
metropolitan areas where multiple districts serve a metropolitan student
population, this dynamic splinters the community's attention when it
comes to public education. To the extent that placing political
accountability for education as close to the local level as possible is a
benefit of local control, it is offset by the fact that citizens are
disincentivized to engage with any schools other than their own. This
shields the broader system from a broader critique and accountability.
Parents, for instance, may be very engaged with problems in their
children's classrooms, schools or even districts, but have rationally
diminished interest in problems beyond those boundaries. Further, to the
extent that any such concern does xist, it is likely to be of a competitive
nature, as schools within a district or districts within a state or
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metropolitan area compete for students, programs, attention, and dollars.
Despite the impact this narrowing has on willingness to consider
education more broadly, it is fully consistent with the American
individualist creed. The focus on the local and the smallest unit-even
in competition with neighbors-is not only tolerated, but encouraged by
this individualism. As a result, local control makes intuitive sense to the
individualistic American mind.
But this individualism and the narrow frame of concern serve to
make challenges to the current system more difficult. For example,
communities that are satisfied with the status quo will find proposals for
change or even criticisms of the current system unnecessary and
unwelcomed.88 Some groups see a greater threat in disrupting the current
system than in preserving it. As a result, communities dissatisfied with
the status quo could then face more than mere lack of enthusiasm from
others but may have to pursue change in the face of active resistance.
Further, because much of the system's sorting occurs with high
racial correlations,9 this effect takes on additional importance. Even
without any individual bias or racism, the structure of the sorting ensures
that many people's frame of concern will be racially homogenous.
White communities are left to care about largely white schools with little
incentive to engage with other schools no matter the racial makeup. And
the same is true of largely white districts. Meanwhile, black
communities concern themselves with largely black schools or districts.
The structure of the system narrows the frame of concern in a way
that tends to generate an "us versus them" dynamic and does so in a
world where "us" and "them" are likely to be racially identifiable. The
effect both reflects and amplifies racial differences. Thus, there is not
only a lack of interracial contact, but an enabling of racial competition.
According to racial threat theory, racial prejudice is most powerful when
the dominant group perceives a political or economic threat from another
group.90 In the competition among narrowly-concerned schools or
districts for students, teachers, programs, and dollars, a great deal is at
stake, and the potential perception of threat from racially identifiable
school or district competitors could trigger these racial threats. The
injection of racial stereotyping and competition further chills enthusiasm
for change.
88. See JAMES RYAN, 5 MILEs AWAY, A WORLD APART 121 (2010) (describing this
phenomenon as "Save the Cities, Spare the Suburbs").
89. See supra Part II.
90. Michael Rocque & Raymond Paternoster, Understanding the Antecedents of the
"School-to-Jail" Link. The Relationship Between Race and School Discipline, 101 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 633, 639 (2011).
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In sum, the sorting mechanisms that allow for differentiation within
the education system have the effect of narrowing concern for others
beyond an individual's own schools, thus making challenges to the
system harder to pursue. In addition, the narrowed lenses encouraged by
this system and the American individualist ideal go beyond blunting
support for change-they may actually encourage resistance to change
from those satisfied with the status quo. And all of this occurs atop a
sorting system that is racially identifiable (even if not racially based),
thus making coalition building more difficult and amplifying the power
of racial stereotyping. As a result, Justice Harlan's aspirational
"colorblind" society is pushed even further into the future.
2. Colorblind Explanations for Racial Disparities
As described above, the fragmented structure of the system actually
discourages close examination of the system as a whole by most
Americans. But for those willing to take a broader look, there are ready
alternative explanations of the disparities that plague education that are
far more flattering than that of the American education system as one
that is structurally unequal and preserving of racial caste. By appealing
to the ideals of meritocracy and colorblindness, the system is able to
deflect attention from its structural flaws.
The explicit and absolutely racial nature of classification under Jim
Crow made it not only constitutionally, but also politically vulnerable.
Indeed, some have argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Brown
did not galvanize, but merely reflected shifting political sentiment with
regard to segregation.91  The achievement of individual African
Americans served as proof that the classification was not justifiable on
any grounds other than racial prejudice, and despite a history that
suggests otherwise, American ideals disfavor such naked discrimination.
As described above, contemporary classifications are not explicitly
racial, nor are they absolute. Instead, they are based on race-neutral
factors like geography, merit, or behavior. Having cleansed the sorting
of its most objectionable characteristic, the modem system classifies with
colorblind criteria that make intuitive political sense. Non-racial
geographic classifications help maintain local support for education, and
non-racial meritocratic classifications help deliver education tailored to
the talents, interests, and needs of students. These classifications are not
only not racial but can also be seen as educationally wise. In this way,
91. Michael J. Klarman, Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement, 80
VA. L. REv. 7, 10 (1994) (arguing that "the Brown decision was judicially conceivable in
1954 only because the forces for change had been preparing the ground for decades").
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colorblindness insulates contemporary sorting from political challenge
by providing non-racial justifications for racially disparate outcomes.
Given the choice, most Americans would likely prefer to think of
the education system as a meritocracy as opposed to a caste system. This
is because, particularly for those who have achieved success, we would
like to believe that we earned it and not that our success was the product
of some bias in the system's structure. Thus, in a competition between
explaining the system as meritocratic or as caste-preserving, the
meritocracy has an inherent political advantage, particularly among
individuals at the higher end of the caste system.
That advantage becomes even greater when the measures of merit
are easy to understand and facially objective. In recent years,
standardized tests have been increasingly utilized to provide a
meritocratic basis for a great deal of differentiation within the system.
The colorblind identification of groups further protects such
differentiated treatment from political challenge.
An example of the use of test scores to provide a merit-based
rationale for sorting and differentiated treatment is instructive. Under the
No Child Left Behind Act ("NCLB"),92 public schools were labeled
"failing" if they failed to achieve adequate yearly progress on state-
administered standardized tests and, as a result, were subject to a variety
of interventions.93 At the extreme, the school's administration could be
removed from the local district and transferred, in some cases, to charter
school operators. Charter schools operate under different policies than
traditional public schools, but this disparate treatment is justified by test
scores-thus by merit, not race.
94
Still, given the disparities that persist, the system is vulnerable to
critiques of bias against black students. Many scholars and advocates
92. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002)
(codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 (2012)).
93. The very threat of these interventions and the necessity of scoring high on the
tests likely led to other curricular effects, such as "teaching to the test." See, e.g., Charles
R. Lawrence III, nho Is the Child Left Behind? The Racial Meaning of the New School
Reform, 39 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 699, 712-13 (2006) (explaining that to meet the
standards, some schools have adopted federally-incentivized curricular programs that
focus heavily on mechanical techniques such as repetition and arguing that this
differentiation in content and delivery makes available different types of knowledge to
students of different social classes). It is likely that this phenomenon occurred
disproportionately often in schools with larger African American populations because
these schools were under greater threat of not meeting state accountability measures. See
id. at 715-16. But these effects are beyond the scope of this Article.
94. Tests are also used to justify much of the other sorting by ability throughout the
system as discussed above. Qualification for gifted services or placement in
academically rigorous courses is often accomplished on the basis of a test of alleged
merit. See DARLING-HAMMOND, supra note 26, at 57-60.
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have made such arguments, essentially claiming that he meritocratic
ideal is illusory due to gaps in opportunities or disparities in evaluation,
or both, that cut across racial lines.95 However, because educational
policies, such as school assignment or meritocratic testing, are facially
colorblind, proving that the system is biased is an uphill battle that
requires roundabout, rather than direct, evidence.
Proving that a race neutral policy has a discriminatory effect can be
politically daunting because there are many plausible causal explanations
for disparate outcomes. The idea that a particular policy ought not have
a racially disparate impact because it is designed and administered in a
colorblind manner is alluring. When a racial effect does follow from a
colorblind practice, the colorblind instinct is to argue that racial
disparities are the result of some other type of non-racial inequity. For
example, lower performance among African American students may be
explained by disparities in teacher quality or parental involvement or
self-motivation or peer effects or school safety or the all-encompassing
effect of poverty.96  It is not that the system is racially biased, the
argument goes. Rather, too much poverty exists in the black community
or too many black students and families do not value education. These
alternative explanations are more comfortable than a comprehensive
indictment of the system as caste system, and they are made particularly
attractive because of the colorblindness ideal and the colorblind policies
that govern the system. In addition, these problems can be addressed
within the system without disturbing the sorting that is so crucial to
maintaining the nation's social hierarchy. If the problem is disparate
access to teacher quality, then schools simply need more high quality
teachers. If it is low parental involvement, then schools need programs
to engage and educate parents. And so on.
In addition, the claim that the American education system
perpetuates racial caste faces another obstacle that discourages belief in
the claim-there are many counterexamples. In a rigid and perfectly
constructed caste system, no students from a lower caste would break
through the barriers imposed on them by the system to enjoy upward
social mobility through education. In the United States, however, there
95. See generally, e.g., STEPHEN MCNAMEE & ROBERT K. MILLER JR., THE
MERITOCRACY MYTH (3d ed. 2014).
96. For example, Linda Darling-Hammond made the point that "[t]he achievement
gap would be much reduced if low-income minority students were routinely assigned
such qualified teachers rather than those they most often encounter." See DARLING-
HAMMOND, supra note 26, at 43-44. While Darling-Hammond noted that the difference
in achievement among students with highly versus poorly qualified teachers was larger
than the difference between a white student with college-educated, parents and black
student with high school-educated parents, id., she did not address the structures
described in this Article that make such assignment unlikely.
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are numerous examples of just this type of story.9 7 Indeed, these are
some of our most inspiring stories; stories that make us collectively feel
good about the opportunities our country offers and the power of
education. If you work hard enough, the stories suggest, anyone can
make it.
Although these stories are rightly celebrated, they play an important
role in masking the flaws of the broader system. By proving that
emerging successfully through the system is possible, successful students
suggest that the meritocracy functions properly. Their success shields
the system from complaints about systemic barriers that prevent their
peers from enjoying similar success. When successful students are
members of minority groups, their success suggests that the system is
genuinely colorblind. Ironically, these successful students offer support
for the American ideals of individualism, meritocracy, and
colorblindness in a way that actually indicates that students who do not
similarly succeed fail to do so as the result of individual rather than
systemic failure. If the successful student made it, the thought goes, why
didn't you? Under this view, what is required to remedy the problem is
not systemic reform, but rather reform of individuals.
By serving as proof that the system can work as a tool for upward
social mobility, successful students give life to the idea that the system
does work. However, data suggests otherwise.98 According to a recent
study, 43 percent of Americans raised in the bottom socioeconomic
quintile remain there as adults, and 70 percent remain in the bottom half
of income; only four percent of those individuals make it to the top
quintile as adults.99 The report further found that African Americans
"have a harder time exceeding the family income and wealth of their
parents" and "are more likely to be stuck in the bottom and to fall from
the middle" income levels.00
This series of narratives about the American system of education-
that it is based on merit and that those who succeed within it have earned
that success; that it operates in a fair manner because it is colorblind; that
non-racial factors can explain racial disparities; that the system would
work fine but for these other factors, including poverty; that stories of
successful students are proof that the system can work-reduces our
97. See generally, e.g., RON SUSKIND, A HOPE IN THE UNSEEN (rev. & updated ed.
2005).
98. PEW CHARITABLE TRUSTS, PURSUING THE AMERICAN DREAM: ECONOMIC




100. Id. at 3.
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collective ability to accept the idea that the education system is a caste-
preserving system. Sorting mechanisms allow for stratification to exist,
and legal doctrines, such as tolerance for inequity or mandating findings
of intent to prove discrimination, make challenges difficult. But these
narratives serve to lessen the political appetite for challenging the system
in the first place. They help ensure that political support for systemic
critiques will be limited, weakening the prospect for reform.
C. PRACTICAL IMPEDIMENTS
The legal and political insulation of contemporary education from
structural change is not absolute. Although federal courts have become
increasingly inhospitable to charges of racial discrimination in education,
some state courts have attempted to at least remedy disparities in
resources across district lines. Similarly, although political support for
many disparity-reducing policies is difficult to generate and sustain,
policymakers from school boards to state legislatures to the federal
Congress have attempted policies aimed at increasing equity in
education. Unfortunately, these remedial efforts are handicapped by the
very system they seek to reform. Practical implementation of equalizing
measures within a highly stratified system where pockets of
disadvantaged students are separated and isolated from others has proven
largely quixotic. Thus, even where legal and political headwinds have
not squashed attempted remedies, effectiveness is hampered by the
system's structure. The structure is institutionally resistant to change
that would interfere with its caste-maintaining nature.
It is worth noting that most attempted interventions take aim at the
challenge of differentiated treatment. They are not interventions to the
sorting of students by district, school, or program, but rather
interventions seeking to ensure that, regardless of how a student is
sorted, she has access to equal opportunities. Perhaps the best example
of these challenges is the school financing suits pursued under state
constitutions in the wake of the Rodriguez decision.
Following the rejection by the U.S. Supreme Court of the argument
that the federal Constitution did not tolerate vast disparities in resources
across school districts, advocates turned their attention to similar claims
under state constitutions. In the second wave of school finance litigation,
a number of state courts found constitutional problems with school
financing schemes that distributed resources unequally within the
state.10 1 State courts, like their federal counterparts, were often reluctant
101. Slightly fewer than half of the state-court challenges to funding schemes-
which had occurred in 36 states-had been successful as of 2004. See John Dayton &
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to order specific remedial action by legislatures in such cases. Instead,
courts often gave legislatures an opportunity to devise a more appropriate
funding scheme, a directive that often led to a never-ending back-and-
forth between court and legislature regarding school finance.1"2 Most
remedial efforts did not substantially interfere with the basic sovereign
district structure or its property-based funding.
Some courts, however, have been more aggressive in ordering
remedies. The results from such efforts provide a cautionary tale. For
example, in 1996, the Connecticut Supreme Court overturned the state's
funding scheme, finding that "the single most important factor that
contributes to the present concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in
Hartford [is] the town-school district system.'1 3 The court suggested
that dismantling the district status quo was necessary for effective
change, but the legislative response involved mostly intradistrict
remedies and a small number of interdistrict transfers.10 4 Even those
transfers, which blurred the sacrosanct lines between districts, however
slightly, required suburban approval, and by 2003, the case was settled
with no impact on the districting scheme.'0 5  The geographic
classification scheme the court criticized has endured.
In addition to court challenges, policymakers dismayed by
educational inequities pursue policies hoping to reduce or eliminate those
inequities. To take one illustrative example, in 2001, Congress passed
NCLB, which mandated that states adopt standards, assessments for
determining whether students were learning those standards, and systems
of accountability to apply in the event that students in a particular school
or district were not learning the standards. The primary mechanism for
determining whether a school or district was on the right track required
consideration of whether it was making adequate yearly progress toward
100 percent proficiency.'0 6 The statute explicitly articulated its desire to
eradicate racial and other gaps in achievement. To that end, the statute
dictated that a school could be sanctioned if any single racial group was
not making adequate yearly progress toward 100 percent proficiency
Anne Dupre, School Funding Litigation: Who's Winning the War?, 57 VAND. L. REv.
2351, 2353 (2004).
102. School finance litigation has been compared to a Russian novel because "it's
long, tedious, and everybody dies at the end." Mark G. Yudof, School Finance Reform in
Texas: The Edgewood Saga, 28 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 499, 499 (1991); see also RYAN,
supra note 88, at 145-79.
103. Sheffv. O'Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1289 (1996).
104. Saiger, supra note 32 at 514-15.
105. Id. at 515 nn. 116-25. A subsequent revised settlement similarly left the district
boundaries untouched.
106. . It is beyond the scope of this Article to assess whether the use of tests in and of
itself has disparate effects within the education system.
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even if the school as a whole was. In name and through policy, the
statute explicitly attempted to transform American education to be more
reflective of the system's mobility-producing ideal. The disaggregation
of data by race held schools and districts accountable for ensuring that
there was no differential treatment of students-at least up to the point
that students were achieving "proficiency."
However, as with the state court-ordered remedies, the practical
realities of the system's structure handicapped the remedies suggested by
the statute. For example, one of the most radical remedies available
under NCLB was the ability of students in schools labeled "failing" to
transfer to non-failing schools.107 However, because of the primacy of
local control and the inviolability of district lines, the transfer option was
of limited effectiveness. First, the statute called only for transfers within
the student's home district. Unfortunately, for a student in a "failing"
school seeking transfer, the fragmentation of school administration
enabled by geographic sorting made it likely that many other schools in
the district would also be performing poorly on state assessments. The
choice, therefore, was among a series of struggling schools-schools
disproportionately made up of minority students. Students who
theoretically had the transfer right as a result of attending a "failing"
school had no realistic option to attend any school that was substantially
different from the one they had been attending, whether demographically
or in quality. 108
The transfer option is particularly noteworthy because it implicitly
recognizes that the geographic classifications, which determine who
attends what school, must be loosened in order to reduce racial
opportunity gaps. This exemplifies modifying the sorting machinery so
that students are not locked into failing schools. The broader movement
embracing school choice rests on a similar idea-allowing students to
sort themselves could undercut the caste-maintaining nature of the
system by enabling students to avoid attending bad schools. This only
works, however, if students have genuine options. Otherwise, the
"choice" simply masks the sorting of some students into disadvantaged
situations. The NCLB transfer policy demonstrates the limitations of
school choice if implemented without interfering with district
sovereignty in districts that are racially homogenous and isolated from
better resources.
107. Daniel J. Losen, Challenging Racial Disparities: The Promise and Pitfalls of the
No Child Left Behind Act's Race-Conscious Accountability, 47 How. L.J. 243, 261
(2004).
108. Goodwin Liu & William L. Taylor, School Choice To Achieve Desegregation,
74 FORDHAM L. REv. 791, 803 (2005) (concluding that the transfer provisions and choice
generally "does not alter the basic geography of educational inequality").
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Thus, perhaps the most substantial practical impediment to
successful large-scale intervention against today's educational disparities
is the degree of isolation enabled by the stratified nature of the sorting
system. Students are isolated in pockets of racially homogeneous, high-
poverty, low-resource schools and districts. Expanding "resource" to
include curricular opportunities, peer quality, and school culture, among
other intangibles that contribute to quality of education makes the
deprivation even more glaring. The teachers who teach, the principals
and school operators who lead, and the institutions that work in these
environments face incredible headwinds from the outset. Isolated
instances of success are rightly celebrated, but widespread reduction of
educational disparities where these isolated pockets remain is unlikely.
One solution is to give students tickets out of these pockets, as the
NCLB transfer policy sought to do. Another logical solution would be to
reduce the degree of isolation within the system. This was attempted
during the era of desegregation-the solution was to ensure that there
were no longer black schools and white schools, but that there were "just
schools."'10 9  With most districts having been relieved of court
supervision and with political and demographic realities limiting the
number of places where isolation-reducing policies can be voluntarily
pursued, these efforts are infrequent today. However, the story of one
community that attempted just such a solution demonstrates the multiple
impediments that insulate contemporary American education from caste-
disrupting change.
Following dismissal of its longstanding desegregation order,
Jefferson County (Louisville) Public Schools ("JCPS") voluntarily
adopted a race- and income-conscious student-assignment plan that
aimed to limit the pockets of isolation in its schools."l 0 This policy,
largely a continuation of the district's preexisting desegregation plan,
was chosen over a neighborhood-schools plan because relying
exclusively on geographic sorting would have led to largely racially
segregated schools. Although practical-and fiscal-difficulties existed
in implementing the district's complex plan, the school board, the local
superintendent, and a majority of the community endorsed it. From a
legal standpoint, the policy was voluntarily adopted rather than judicially
mandated, so concerns about remedial authority and deference to local
109. Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 442 (1968) (identifying an obligation on
local school boards to successfully comply with desegregation mandate as formulation of
a new plan "which promise[s] realistically to convert promptly to a system without a
'white' school and a 'Negro' school, but just schools").
110. See Daniel Kiel, Accepting Justice Kennedy's Dare: The Future of Integration
in a Post-PICS World, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2873, 2881-82 (2010).
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control were neutralized. The plan was challenged, however, as a form
of reverse discrimination-it was not colorblind.
The case was consolidated with a similar case from Seattle and
reached the Supreme Court in 2007 as Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District."' In a crowning blow to even
voluntary efforts to reduce racial isolation in schools, the Supreme Court
ruled the plan unconstitutional.' 1 2 The Court held that the policy's race-
conscious assignment efforts violated the colorblindness mandate,
arguing that the constitutional problem discriminated in favor of African
Americans and even citing Brown.113 Chief Justice Roberts expressed
the essence of this sentiment in the plurality opinion: "[t]he way to stop
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis
of race."'1 4 This is Justice Harlan's colorblindness ideal taken to its
logical endpoint, but it conflicts with his aspiration of a caste-less
society.
Here, a school district, with community support, enacted a bold
policy aimed at reducing racial isolation in schools, one of the primary
causes of educational disparities-and thus, a guardian of racial caste-
only to have the plan rejected. Following the legal rejection of the plan,
the district attempted to develop a new policy that would fit the Court's
narrowing standards,"5 but community support for the program quickly
dissipated."6 Having been rejected legally, the policy was ultimately
rejected politically as well. The classification system and the disparities
it produced endured. The practical, political, and legal impediments to
change proved too powerful even for this rare community taking
aggressive action to create circumstances where education will do more
to disrupt racial caste than preserve it.
CONCLUSION
When Justice Harlan wrote that there is "no caste here," he
articulated a legal argument: in the eyes of the law, there could be no
distinguishing among citizens. But the sentiment expresses a broader
ideal in the opportunities promised by the United States in contrast to
other rigidly-stratified nations. That this ideal remains elusive in practice
111. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
112. Id. at 745.
113. Id. at 747.
114. Id. at 748.
115. Kiel, supra note 110, at 2895-2900.
116. The diminution of public support for the student-assignment plan ultimately led
the JCPS Board to vote not to retain the district's superintendent. Thomas McAdam,
Louisville School Board Gives Berman the Axe, EXAMINER.COM (Nov. 22, 2010, 9:33
PM), http://www.examiner.com/article/louisville-school-board-gives-berman-the-axe.
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and that the very system best positioned to bring it to life may be
working against its realization raises questions about our true national
commitment to a society without caste, particularly racial caste.
However, this Article presumes that the "no caste" ideal is widely
held. Our history, from a time when teaching a slave to read might merit
20 lashes to a time when many advocates of many races are committed to
confronting educational disparities, is evidence of the validity of this
presumption. The Article seeks to give structure to a broader critique in
order to unleash this caste-less ideal yet again.
When Charles Hamilton Houston observed the structures upon
which Jim Crow was built, the task of altering that structure must have
seemed daunting. The challenge is similar today. This Article is an
invitation to institutions and individuals to consider crucial questions that
might begin to undermine the root causes of structural educational
inequality in addition to the work of treating its symptoms. For instance:
are there viable arguments that could reduce the amount of sorting and
differentiation within the system, whether in funding and administration,
assignment of students, or tracking within districts, schools or
classrooms?; what legal strategies remain available and what new legal
arguments could be pursued to resurrect discrimination claims?; and
perhaps most crucially, what can be done to alter the narrative that the
current structure is not the primary problem?
Over time, the field of legitimacy shifted against state-mandated
segregation, as Justice Harlan predicted that it would. The Brown
decision was a crucial marker in that process. If advocates for
confronting contemporary educational disparities are to succeed, a
similarly seismic shift will be required-the more vividly the magnitude
of these structural flaws can be revealed, the more quickly the nation's
education system will move toward Justice Harlan's ideal.
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